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It is widely believed that baseline imbalances in randomized clinical trials must necessarily be random. Yet
even among masked randomized trials conducted with allocation concealment, there are mechanisms by
which patients with specific covariates may be selected for inclusion into a particular treatment group. This
selection bias would force imbalance in those covariates, measured or unmeasured, that are used for the
patient selection. Unfortunately, few trials provide adequate information to determine even if there was
allocation concealment, how the randomization was conducted, and how successful the masking may have
been, let alone if selection bias was adequately controlle d. In this article we reinforce the message that
allocation details should be presented in full. We also facilitate such reporting by identifying and clarifying
the role of specific reportable design features. Because the designs that eliminate all selection bias are rarely
feasible in practice, our development has important implications for not only the implementation, but also the
reporting and interpretation, of randomized clinical trials.
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Introduction
It is in this light that we critically evaluate
the ability of masking, allocatio n concealment, and
randomization as actually implemented to produce
treatment groups that differ only randomly. If they
cannot do so, then observed covariate imbalances
may be systematic, and may reflect selection bias.
Observed treatment effects could then be
attributable to biases, and not to the treatments
themselves.
Selection bias can compromise the
credibility
of
standard
between-group
comparisons, especially when the trial is
conducted by a sponsor with a vested interest in
the outcome (Hogel & Gaus, 1999). Yet details
sufficient to assess the success of randomization,
allocation concealment, and masking are rarely
reported (Kyriakidi & Ioannidis, 2002).
This draws into question the reliability of
the results of many RCTs that have been otherwise
well conducted. In fact, if randomization is
defined so as to eliminate the possibility of any
subversion, then we question whether there has
ever been a truly randomized trial. The irony is
that until sufficient design details are routinely
reported, it will be impossible to quantify the

When lecturing on selection bias, we have
addressed audience questions about how selection
bias can occur in randomized clinical trials
(RCTs). After all, it may be argued, if any
subversion occurred, then the trial was not truly
randomized. This statement implies that
randomization confers absolute protection against
any subversion, so that any covariate imbalances
must be random. Similar abilities are often
ascribed to allocation concealment or masking.
Yet the effect of an action may differ from its
objective; washed dishes, e.g., may remain dirty;
cooked food may remain cold; and treated patients
may remain sick.
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extent to which selection bias actually occurs in
RCTs, yet this lack of reporting is likely due to
failure to appreciate the extent to which selection
bias occurs in RCTs. Our development clarifies
those details that should be presented in RCT
reports. It is our hope that more RCT reports will
provide these details, and test for selection bias
explicitly (Berger & Exner, 1999).
What Are Randomization, Allocation
Concealment, and Masking?
In a discussion of the distinction between
a claim of masking and true masking, Oxtoby et
al. (1989) pointed out that “the presumption that a
plan to which one has aspired has come to fruition
by virtue of aspiration alone is not science, and is
particularly inapposite for a profession which
should have a reputation for making clear
distinctions between fantasy and reality”. This
profound remark highlights the distinction
between an action and its effect. Masking may be
defined as either the process (researchers not
revealing treatment codes until the database is
locked) or the result (complete ignorance of all
trial participants as to which patients received
which treatments). A masking claim indicates only
the former; this may help to ensure the ignorance
of some parties, but is unlikely to ensure the
desired state of complete ignorance.
As the legal term “inevitable discovery”
suggests, knowledge transfers by various
mechanisms. It may be possible to fool all of the
people some of the time, or some of the people all
of the time, but it is not possible to fool all of the
people all of the time. Just as a speed limit is a
statement not about how fast drivers drive but
rather about how fast they are encouraged to
drive, so too is a policy of masking a statement not
about who knew what (and when) but rather about
a process.
Masking is often said to be possible only
some of the time, while allocation concealment
(Schulz, 1995a,b; 1996), which is essentially the
masking of each allocation just until it is executed,
is always possible. This confusion of the two
definitions is a double -standard. If masking is
possible only some of the time, then clearly
reference is being made to the result, and not the
process.
To be fair, then, one would have to ask if
the result of allocation concealment is always

possible. Sealed envelopes have been held to
lights, phantom patients have been enrolled, and
locked files have been raided to determine
upcoming treatment allocations in successful
subversions of allocation concealment (Schulz,
1995a). Also, it may be clear what a given patient
would receive, if enrolled, if cluster randomization
(Jordhoy et al., 2002) or minimization (Pocock &
Simon, 1975) is used. Drug bottle numbers can
also lead to prediction (Kuznetsova, 2002). So
only the process of allocation concealment, but not
its result, can be ensured. Without the result of
allocation concealment, selection bias remains a
concern.
Mechanisms for Selection Bias, and Specific
Countermeasures
To focus ideas, we confine our attention to
selection bias that interferes with internal validity
(a fair comparison, Mark, 1997); we do not
consider external validity. Groups of patients to be
compared may differ in important ways even
before any intervention is applied (Prorok,
Hankes, & Bundy, 1981). These baseline
imbalances cannot be attributed to the
interventions, but they can interfere with and
overwhelm the comparison of the interventions
(Green & Byar, 1984).
If treatments are independent of patient
characteristics, then any baseline imbalances (even
if statistically significant) are due to chance
variation only. This is one reason often cited for
using randomization.
On the other hand, a systematic
explanation for the imbalances, known or
unknown, would constitute selection bias, even if
the imbalances are not statistically significant, or
even readily observed (Berger & Exner, 1999).
We present a sequence of mechanisms by which
selection bias may occur, starting with
observational studies in Section A, and such
countermeasures as randomization, allocation
concealment, and masking (see Table 1).
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Table 1: What to Report in Randomized Clinical Trials To Control Selection Bias
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Concern
Differential Allocation Discretion

Report
Planned allocation proportions
Number of screened and randomized patients by the group to which
they were or would have been randomized had they been randomized

Deferred Enrollment

List patients who were screened twice or more, or that there were
none

Allocation Concealment

Specific means of concealing the future allocations

Predicted Allocations

Specific restrictions on the randomization (including block sizes)
Specific methods of concealing the past allocations (masking)
Evidence of unmasking (including differential rates of observable
adverse events, any emergencies requiring intentional unmasking,
and rates of correct treatment group guesses at de-briefing)

Baseline Imbalances

Compare baseline covariates across treatment groups

Selection Bias

Graph key covariates against P{active}, as in Berger and Exner
(1999)
Graph response against P{active} within each treatment group, per
Berger and Exner (1999).
List stratification errors (if any), or that there were none
_____________________________________________________________________________________
A. Selection Bias in Observational Studies or with
Consumer Randomization
Investigators may assign treatments based
on patient characteristics (Green & Byar, 1984;
Rubin, 1977). Patients may select either their
treatment or, with consumer randomization (Bird,
2001), their randomization probability, at least
from among a given set of choices. Allocation
discretion may be available to the patient, the
investigator, both, or neither (dictated allocation).
Those patients selecting one treatment or
probability may differ systematically from those
selecting another (Green & Byar, 1984), so
dictated allocation (no freedom of choice) is a
countermeasure to prevent patient characteristics
from influencing the allocation sequence through
either overt treatment assignment based on patient
characteristics or self-selection.
B. Selection Bias with Dictated Allocation
If allocation is alternated, then either
patients with even accession numbers or patients

with odd accession numbers receive the active
treatment. The others receive the control. This
dictated allocation would prevent the type of
selection bias considered in Section A. But with
sequential accrual, knowledge of the upcoming
treatment, and enrollment discretion (Chalmers,
1990), an investigator could deny enrollment to
patients lacking the characteristics that would
make them “suitable ” to receive the upcoming
treatment (Schulz, 1995a; Schulz & Grimes,
2002a).
The selection bias enabled by the
predictable allocation sequence (Schulz & Grimes,
2002b) can be controlled by creating instead an
unpredictable allocation sequence, or randomizing
(Rosenberger & Lachin, 2002). The second
countermeasure is the use of actual (not virtual,
quasi-, or pseudo-) randomization (Berger &
Bears, 2003) to prepare the allocation sequence.
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C. Selection Bias with Dictated Allocation and
Randomization
Urn randomization (Wei & Lachin, 1988)
is conducted by tossing a (possibly biased) coin
each time a patient is to be allocated. Heads
indicates active treatment, and tails indicates
control. There is no actual allocation discretion,
yet having screened and evaluated a given patient,
the investigator might exercise de facto allocation
discretion to reject the toss and repeat until the
preferred allocation is observed.
Another mechanism for selection bias
with dictated allocation and randomization would
be possible if minimization, or dynamic
randomization (Pocock & Simon, 1975), were
used to force balance with respect to certain
covaria tes. The allocation is determined by
minimizing an imbalance function, and
randomization may be used to break the ties. So
there is both dictated allocation and
randomization. Yet because most allocations will
be deterministic, it would be possible to determine
the allocation to be made once a patient has been
identified. A patient enrollment decision may be
based on a combination of the treatment to be
assigned and values of observed covariates that
were not used to define the imbalance function.
Randomization is conventional if the allocation
sequence is generated in advance of screening any
patients,
and
unconventional
otherwise.
Conventional randomization prevents the types of
selection bias discussed in this section, and is our
third countermeasure.
D. Selection Bias with Dictated Allocation and
Conventional Randomization
As in Section B, selection bias may result
from enrollment discretion and advance
knowledge of the allocation sequence; the latter
may be facilitated by conventional randomization,
as the allocation sequence may be posted publicly
before patients are screened (Schulz & Grimes,
2002a). A countermeasure to eliminate this
advance knowledge is that each allocation be
determined only after the patient to be enrolled is
identified (Clarke, 2002), as occurs with
minimization (Pocock & Simon, 1975). Either the
allocation to be made or the patient to be enrolled
has to be selected first; whichever it is may
influence the other, and the biases possible with
unconventional randomization (Section C) are at

least as serious as the biases possible with
conventional randomization.
Unconventional randomization may not be
able to eliminate advance knowledge of patient
characteristics, but one might hope to eliminate
advance knowledge of the allocation sequence
with conventional randomization and the fourth
countermeasure, allocation concealment, which is
often taken to mean precisely this lack of advance
knowledge. But recall that allocation concealment
signifies only that the allocation codes are not
intentionally revealed. Even with steps to ensure
that these codes cannot be observed, e.g. by
holding an envelope to a light (Schulz, 1995a,b), it
is not possible to enumerate, and rule out, all
mechanisms by which allocations can be observed.
We are not prepared to take the success of
allocation concealment on faith in an actual trial;
we do so for the purpose of this article to
demonstrate that even in this unrealistically
optimistic case, subversion is still possible.
E. Selection Bias with (D) and Allocation
Concealment
In a randomized depression study of nurse
telehealth care (Hunkeler et al., 2000), the initial
40:60 randomization to two groups later became
40:20 to those same two groups, with the
remaining 40% allocated to a new third group. If
the change in allocation proportions was planned
(which need not be the case; see Lippman et al.,
2001), then even with allocation concealment it
may still be possible to predict (but not observe)
future allocations. Knowing that more late patients
than early patients would be allocated to the third
group constitutes advance knowledge of the
allocations which, though imperfect, allows for
deferred enrollment (Schulz, 1996) of those
subjects most “suitable ” for the third group until
after the new proportions took effect. The fifth
countermeasure, then, is the fixed allocation
proportions that prevent this.
F. Selection Bias with (E) and Fixed Allocation
Proportions
Randomization is unrestricted (Schulz &
Grimes, 2002b) if a patient’s likelihood of
receiving either treatment is independent of all
previous allocations, and is restricted (ter Riet &
Kessels, 1995) otherwise. The random allocation
rule (Schulz & Grimes, 2002b), in which both
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treatment groups must be assigned equally often,
is one form of restricted randomization, as the
final allocation would be determined by the prior
ones. Even with allocation concealment and fixed
allocation proportions, patterns created by
restrictions on the randomization allow prediction
of the allocation sequence. Berger and Exner
(1999) quantified this extent of advance
knowledge with the probability, P{active}, of a
given patient being allocated to the active group
given the previous allocations.
With 1:1 allocation, P{active}=0.5 for the
first patient; with alternation (Section B),
P{active} is always either 0 or 1. Note that
P{active} reflects the restrictions on the allocation
sequences, and becomes a patient characteristic
only after that patient is randomized. With
enrollment discretion, P{active} may be used, in
conjunction with the estimated potential outcomes
of each patient to each treatment, say
Y={Y(A),Y(C)} for the active and control
treatments, respectively, as a basis for enrollment
decisions.
Gender, age, race, pre-existing medical
conditions, or other baseline characteristics may
be considered in deriving the value of Y for a
given patient. Based on Y, the investigator might
select a range of P{active} values for which the
patient would be enrolled. If the P{active} value at
the time this patient is screened happens to fall
outside of this patient’s P{active} range, then the
patient will be denied enrollment, and another
patient will be screened. Only when a patient is
found with a P{active} range to match the actual
P{active} value will the patient be enrolled.
Selection bias occurs if the P{active}
range is restricted based on Y. It would be
possible, e.g., to enroll patients only if P{active}
and Y are both large (suppose that larger Y values
indicate better responses) or both small, but not if
they are discordant (Schulz, 1995a). This
possibility is depicted in Table 2, using
randomized blocks of size four to calculate
P{active} (Berger & Exner, 1999). Notice that not
only does treatment assignment for randomized
patients depend upon the allocation sequence, but
in fact Patients #S5, #S7, #S9, and #S10 may or
may not be randomized depending on the
allocation sequence, and Patient #S3 cannot get
the control.
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Discussion
Few RCT reports make any effort to address the
potential for selection bias. Presumably, this is due
to unrealistically optimistic definitions of
randomization, allocation concealment, and
masking. Unfortunately, even in combination,
these design features as implemented cannot
eliminate selection bias. One may argue that while
selection bias is possible in theory, its mechanisms
are implausible, especially when the main analyses
have low p-values.
Unfortunately, history has demonstrated
the fallibility of the plausibility test; at best low pvalues rule out (probabilistically) chance events,
but they do not rule out biases (Berger, 2000;
Berger et al., 2000; Grimes and Schulz, 2002).
Because of the one-sponsor problem (Hogel &
Gaus, 1999) and the vested interest the one
sponsor usually has in the outcome of the trial, the
best way to offer a convincing argument that a
trial was free of a certain bias is to eliminate the
possibility of its occurrence. Hence, the burden
needs to be on the researchers to demonstrate the
reliability of their results. In this article we have
presented a number of countermeasures, few
combinations of which would eliminate the
potential for selection bias. In most cases, then, it
is unrealistically optimistic to believe that RCTs
are insulated from severe bias (Schulz, 1996).
We are hopeful that the information
presented in Table 1 will accompany reports of
future trials, preferably in the text of the article,
but possibly in an accompanying web site. Such
transparency would enable readers to determine
the extent to which various mechanisms for
selection bias were possible in a given trial, and
the extent to which it appears as though there
actually was selection bias. The refined measures
of trial quality could be used in determining the
extent to which specific trials influence policy and
meta-analyses. This would exert pressure on those
who design trials to design better trials. We are
hopeful that journal editors, regulators, and
granting institutions will rely, in part, on this
information to make their important decisions.
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Table 2: Selection Bias with Randomization and Allocation Concealment.

S
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12

{(A C C A); (C C A A)} {(A C A C); (C A A C)}
P{active} Range* P{active} Randomized P{active} Randomized
[0.50,1.00]
0.50
Active
0.50
Active
[0.00,0.33]
0.33
Control
0.33
Control
[1.00,1.00]
0.50
0.50
[0.00,0.50]
0.50
Control
0.50
Active
[0.50,1.00]
1.00
Active
0.00
[0.00,0.50]
0.50
Control
0.00
Control
[0.00,0.50]
0.67
0.50
Control
[0.67,1.00]
0.67
Control
0.67
Active
[0.67,1.00]
1.00
Active
0.50
[0.00,0.50]
1.00
0.50
Active
[0.33.0.67]
1.00
0.00
[0.00,1.00]
1.00
Active
0.00
Control

*The range of P{active} values for which the patient gets randomized. P{active}
computed according to the formula of Berger and Exner [3] using the randomized
block procedure with a fixed block size of four. Not only does treatment assignment
for randomized patients depend upon the allocation sequence, but in fact Patients
#S5, #S7, #S9, and #S10 may or may not be randomized depending on the
allocation sequence, and Patient #S3 cannot get the control.
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